Enrichment
Why firms choose not to disclose the quality of their products
2nd February 2015
Rather than explicitly revealing information about the quality of their products and services, many firms prefer to signal quality through the prices they charge, typically working on the assumption that a high price indicates high quality. New research by Maarten Janssen and Santanu Roy provides a new explanation for why firms choose not to disclose quality directly – and explains how prices that are set to signal quality can distort actual buying decisions.
Geoff Riley
Geoff Riley FRSA has been teaching Economics for over thirty years. He has over twenty years experience as Head of Economics at leading schools. He writes extensively and is a contributor and presenter on CPD conferences in the UK and overseas.
You might also like
Paul Ormerod: Meat and potato pies and the Nobel Prize in economics
10th January 2013
Information Failures: The Bazaar
27th February 2011
Information failure in the NHS
23rd January 2014
Information Economics - How Many Sugars in a Coke?
5th January 2014
Information Failure: How sweet are you?
2nd December 2013
Cigarettes, demerit goods and government failure
12th July 2013
Alcohol information failure
13th January 2010
Information Failure: Solariums
16th April 2008