Revision Update: The Executive: Prime Ministerial Power

The constraints upon the power of the Prime Minister have been clearly evident in the past year. These constraints have come from:1. Within the cabinet from his own Conservative ministers2. Within the cabinet from Liberal Democrat ministers3. His own parliamentary party

1.) Conservative ministers as a constraint

Comment is often made of how politicians seek to climb the “greasy pole” as Disraeli declared when he became Prime Minister in the late nineteenth century. It might have been expected that Cameron may have faced more internal opposition (see below) from the Liberal Democrats in the cabinet than from his own party, but there have been signs that not all Conservative ministers have been willing to follow his lead. Indeed, some have earned the epithet of “the national union of ministers” due to their opposition to some of the government’s proposals for cuts to their department.

This “union” is said to include:

· Theresa May defending Home Office spending;

· as is Philip Hammond at defence.

· Chris Grayling, the Justice Secretary is also reported to have become less compliant to plans which would prevent spending on his proposals to pay private companies who are successful in stopping reoffending.

Some ministers are said to harbour their own leadership ambitions with May, Hammond and Gove heading the list of possible rivals to Cameron’s crown. Others such as Jeremy Hunt and Justine are also said to have their eye on the proze of leadership of the party.

2.) Liberal Democrat ministerial opposition

Vince Cable has long led the charge against the austerity measures of George Osborne. He not only opposes cuts to his Business Innovation and Skills Department’s spending which he believes could threaten economic growth, but has publically criticised the “ideological jihad against public spending” that some Conservatives want. He also opposes further cuts to the welfare budget.

3.) The Conservative party as a constraint

There has been considerable opposition to Cameron’s modernising agenda and the concessions offered to the Liberal Democrats as part of the coalition agreement. The fact that the party performed badly in the Eastleigh by election and lost the triple AAA credit rating has only fanned these confrontational flames.

It is normally the case that one expects a Conservative leader to exercise more power and authority over his party than his Labour counterpart. The Conservative party is more hierarchical and ideologically disposed to accept the edicts from its leader and consequently the level of opposition to Cameron has come as something a surprise. This is not only because of the structural arrangements and culture within the Conservative party but because of the potential electoral damage such disunity can cause. Internal political squabbles can cost a party dearly as Labour learnt to its cost in the 1980s. The overt opposition that Cameron has faced from his own backbenchers has not only curbed his own powers but also could potentially dent their electoral prospects in 2015. Unlike Labour in 1997, it seems that years in the political wilderness of opposition have not instilled a need for party unity.

It is argued that Cameron has not helped his cause in this regard. Rather like the US president, the Prime Minister needs use his power of persuasion in order to maintain support from his own party. It could be argued further that Cameron has to some extent defined himself against his own party. He stands for what they don’t; such an approach is hardly likely to result in unswerving support from the backbenchers.

It is often alleged that the whips are the sinister agents of party discipline who ensure that recalcitrant MPs toe the party line due to the fear of deselection and the diminished prospect of promotion to ministerial rank. However, it should be noted that the whips also serve as a two way communication channel. One of their purposes is to relay to the leadership the feelings of the backbenchers and the leadership needs to accommodate their views. The organisation of the Conservative backbench MPs is called the 1922 Committee. This title commemorates the occasion when backbench MPs rose up to rid themselves of the then Prime Minister, Lloyd George, to select one of their won, Andrew Bonar Law.[1] The same fate could await Cameron as talk of leadership challenges has been circulating which bears testimony to the vulnerability of his position. Yet Cameron has done little to win over the hearts of minds of the Conservative backbenchers who may be unwilling to accept his policy positions. This lack of communication with his own MPs has left him isolated and lacking in authority and seems to have even resulted in a clearly stated dislike of him and his leadership. On the home page of Philip Davies, Conservative MP for Shipley, he proudly proclaims “My aim is to give the best service to my constituents and to vigorously hold the government to account”. This is some way epitomises the attitude of a sizeable proportion of Conservative MPs who seem more committed to their own right wing ideological principles that some of Cameron’s attempts at modernising. They provide a graphic illustration of the applicability of the old maxim that no Prime Minister cab ride roughshod over his own party.

In these circumstances, it seems that Cameron may need to keep offering sops to the right wing of his party and forsake the modernisation programme in Ganesh[2] describes as “a grim, hand to mouth kind of premiership that matches the age he governs in”. in the cabinet reshuffle mentioned earlier, the right were appeased with the appointments of Grayling, Patterson and Villiers. Such an approach would not suggest that Prime Ministerial Cameron is acting in a presidential fashion.

EXAMPLE ANSWER: EVALULATE THE IMPACT OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT UPON THE POWER OF THE PRIME MINISTER

In the recent past there have been suggestions that the UK has developed a system of prime ministerial government where the Prime Minister is able to dominate cabinet. Rawnsley asserted that Blair was not “primus inter pares” (first amongst equals) but simply “Primus”. The coalition government formed after the 2010 election however would at first glance suggest that such a development is unlikely and that a more collective form of cabinet government has emerged. Indeed the Guardian remarked “Coalition has given the cabinet a role which it rarely enjoyed under single-party governments in recent decades.”^[3]

The impact of the coalition can best be assessed by considering two particular aspects that allow a Prime Minister to dominate a cabinet: The power of patronage and the power over policy making.

Right for the outset it was clear that prime ministerial power had been diluted as part of the coalition agreement. There were 5 Liberal Democrats in the cabinet at the start (Clegg, Cable, Laws, Alexander and Huhne) and a further 15 junior ministerial appointments. Consequently the suggestion cabinet would be an “echo chamber” of Cameron’s personal ideology as Thatcher managed to achieve with her dismissal of the “wets” and Blair with the selection of Blairites such as Milburn could not be applied here. Further evidence of this came with the resignation of Laws and Huhne. Clegg, not Cameron, was able to make these appointments. Clearly then the power of patronage has to be shared and prime ministerial power has diminished as a consequence.

Similarly the Prime Minister has been unable to completely control the policy agenda. The Lib Dems have been able to insist upon a referendum of the Alternative Vote, concessions to the NHS reforms and most recently have claimed that they were responsible for the tax cuts for the lower paid in the 2012 budget. Indeed such has been the level of concessions to the Lib Dems that some Conservative backbenchers have openly defied the government and 81 joined in a backbench rebellion demanding a referendum on continued EU membership. Cameron has been criticised for conceding too much to the Liberal Democrats.

Within the coalition, Clegg chairs vitally important cabinet committees with a focus on domestic policy in areas such as health, education, policing and constitutional reform. As cabinet committees can be regarded as the real powerhouse of cabinet with decisions and policies being shaped there, Clegg’s role would again suggest that not only Clegg the most powerful deputy P.M> ever but that the Prime Minister’s powers have been curbed.

However it is possible to counter the views that the powers of the P.M. have been curbed by examining in closer detail the constraints upon any P.M. and the extent to which there is, or ever was, prime ministerial government in the UK.

It is true that there are Lib Dems in the cabinet and government but every P.M. faces real constraints when making appointments. They need to select those with experience and ability; they need to balance the ideological wings of the party (such as Cameron’s appointment of Clarke to illustrate balance as Clarke is a Europhile one-nation Tory and has previous cabinet experience). The notion of a cabinet completely full of sycophants and yes men is wide of the mark. Blair’s cabinets included those who might not be considered as Blairites such as Prescott. PMs need to be constantly on guard against the danger of rival camps posed from leading rivals who are not bound by the constraints of collective responsibility if they are not selected to the cabinet. Consequently, the coalition has not seen a dilution of the power of patronage as it was already subject to many constraints.

In a similar vein, the notion that the PM could decide policy unilaterally is also open to question. Most PMs have used an inner or partial cabinet. Blair operated with the “big 4” in his first term with Brown, Cook, Straw and Mandelson. PMs do not have the staff to run every department. Cameron operates with the “quad” of himself, Osborne, Clegg and Alexander as his A team. Like Blair with Brown, Osborne as Chancellor is a powerful figure. So whilst power is shared in an oligarchical fashion in the Cameron cabinet, this is not a new departure and the idea of a pluralistic central executive is a trait evident in previous administrations.

It has been argued that the “office of PM, is whatever the holder chooses to make of it”. It could be said that both Thatcher and Blair led from the front and were dominant forceful PMs. Major was more collegial and consensual. Brown was even accused of being “Stalinist”! Cameron however has been criticised for being too slack. He has been willing to delegate and not take charge hence the confusion over the NHS reforms which Lansley seemed to be the architect of alone.

This would suggest that the powers of the PM have not changed all that greatly as a result of the coalition. There can be little doubt that the power of the PM has increased over time and there are elements of a “British presidency” (Foley) with the intense media focus on number ten. However that is not to say the PM can control and dominate the Cabinet. This is the case for Cameron and was the case for others. Events such as the recession and the scandal over Murdoch all harm the PM and as the Poll Tax protests show which led to Thatcher’s demise, all PMs are subject to the whims of the cabinet, their own party and the public.

EXAMPLE ANSWER: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE CABINET FULFILL ITS FUNCTIONS?

The notion of cabinet government is one that has been challenged for a considerable time. Prime Ministers such as Blair and Thatcher would suggest that the P.M. is not “primus inter pares” but merely first. However, it could be argued cabinet still serves a purpose, albeit one of reduced importance.

Perhaps the most important role of the cabinet is to make policy. There are several reasons to suggest why this may not be the case. Ministers are too busy to concern themselves with the affairs of other departments. Jeremy Hunt as new secretary of health will have little interest in Gove’s educational reforms as his hands will already be full meeting the demands of cabinet, parliament and the media in implementing Lansley’s health reforms.

By the same token, policy making is so complex and technical that non-specialists will not have the knowledge to effectively contribute to policy issues that do not relate to their department. Davey the environment secretary may be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of off-shore wind turbines, but other cabinet ministers will not. Hence, policy decisions will not be made by cabinet as a whole.

Arguably the most significant factor which prevents cabinet from fulfilling its policy making function is the increase in PM power. Indeed, it has long been held that the UK now has a system of PM government not cabinet government and Foley has detected signs of a “British presidency” such is the scale of PM dominance. The power of patronage prevents minsters from speaking out against the PM for fear of losing their position in cabinet. The power to hire and fire, promote and demote as evidenced by Greening’s demotion from Transport to International Aid recently, has created in a timid cabinet full of “yes men” and sycophants who merely implement the policies advanced by the PM. In her resignation from cabinet, Short lamented the loss of collective decision making and highlighted that all the cabinet got was “diktats from on high”.

Whilst it would seem that policy making is not a function that the cabinet as a whole fulfils, it could be argued that it still retains a degree of control in this area. The PM is unable to run every government department and so needs to delegate and to rely upon the work of individual ministers. Every policy may not be discussed in cabinet but the big issues are. In this sense cabinet acts as a clearing house which focuses on major policy areas like economic and foreign policy. A PM cannot ride roughshod over the cabinet. To do so would be to risk loss of support which could ultimately bring the PM down as Mrs Thatcher found in 1990.

Cabinet committees can be regarded as an extension of cabinet government. Ministers within an area can focus on a policy area and present their policies to full cabinet for final agreement. It should be noted that cabinet has the final say. Resignations such as Short and Cook over the Iraq war highlight damage the government and highlight the pitfalls of attempting to bypass cabinet.

It should also be noted that cabinet have assumed over important roles. It is the main forum where information can be offered about work and issues relating to a particular department. Cabinet can play a vital role in coordinating the role of government. At the present time with the austerity measures, it is vital that we have, as Blair said “joined up” government and that all departments implement cuts on a pro rata basis.

The coalition too also highlights how cabinet still fulfils its functions. Cameron needs to ensure that the Lib Dems are on board; splits over policy areas such as energy and human rights need resolution in order to preserve government unity. For this reason, it has been argued that cabinet now has a role that it “rarely enjoyed under single party government” according to the Guardian.

Cabinet still fulfils the important function of crisis management. The COBRA committee can meet to resolve issues such as flooding, the foot and mouth crisis or international developments such as the Arab Spring.

Consequently the death of cabinet government has been greatly exaggerated. It still fulfils several functions even if some have been reduced due to increased PM power.

IS THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE IN PERIL?

Whilst President Obama is able to make a raft of appointments to his administration, the UK adopts a very different approach to the composition of the bureaucracy. In the US, the spoils system allows the president to appoint approximately 7,000 people to senior positions in various government agencies and departments.

This exercise of patronage is in stark contrast to the traditional principles of the British Civil Service. Rather than reward those who have been loyal and assisted the party and candidates in the winning of elections, the British Civil Service is based upon meritocracy and permanence. That is to say appointment is not based upon party political affiliation but on ability. Indeed, one of the cornerstones of the Civil Service is that it has to be political neutral. It has to be able to serve a government of any political persuasion. There is a “master and servant” relationship at the heart of ministerial – civil servant relationships with the ministers holding the upper hand. This allows the civil service to remain unchanged even if the government is comprised of a new party or parties following a general election.

Allegations of the Civil Service playing too great a political role have rather faded from view. In the past, Labour governments complained that there was a Conservative bias within the civil Service which resulted in their policies being delayed and ministers frustrated. More recently Conservative ministers have identified a conservative bias as Civil Servants have been accused of resisting change. Such suggestions have been less to the fore due to:

1. Radical changes to the Civil Service from the 1980s, most notably with the Next Steps reforms, which has reduced the input of the service into policy formulation and ;
2. An increased reliance on Special Advisors by ministers for advice and information.

Even so there have been recent calls for greater ministerial involvement in the selection of senior civil servants, Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister, has argued for senior civil servants within a department to be selected by the relevant minister.

These proposals were criticised by both the Civil service commission and the Labour party. There is some ministerial involvement in the selection of appointments but this is merely on an advisory basis. The final decision lies with a selection ministerial panel although the minister can choose not to ratify their selection. David Cameron rejected climate change expert, David Kennedy, as permanent secretary to the Department of Climate Change and Energy. Critics of the proposal argued that this would amount to a politicisation of the Civil Service which would threaten its neutrality and the ability of the Civil Servant to serve a government of another political persuasion.

Given the propensity for ministers not to resign over departmental errors, as was illustrated by the West Coast line bid fiasco and Border Control Agency‘s relaxation of immigration controls, not only is the accountability and anonymity of the Civil Service likely to change, but also its permanence and neutrality if the government decides to press ahead with these proposed reforms.

MINISTER AND CIVIL SERVICE RELATIONS – AN END TO SIR HUMPHREY^[4]

The relationship between ministers and civil servants became centre stage recently with

1. The west coast rail line bid fiasco where civil servants were blamed for flawed accounting procedures

1. The lapse in immigration controls which led to the resignation of Brodie Clark at the Border Control Agency.

On the one hand, the civil servants can be portrayed as being a bureaucratic hurdle that prevent radical governments from implementing change. Another charge is that their advice cannot be relied upon and hence ministers are increasingly using their own special advisors rather than the civil servants. Blair argued that a (party) political centre was needed to drive through reforms and so he set up:

a) The delivery unit;

b) The strategy unit and;

c) The policy unit

in No 10 as a “counter bureaucracy” to strengthen the minister’s hand against civil service and to ensure that reforms did not stall.

Civil servants argue that these allegations are unfounded and that blame lies with incompetent ministers. Dave Penman, the general secretary of the First Division Association which represents senior civil servants stated, “Leadership is what civil servants should be able to expect from ministers, not constant criticism and innuendo questioning their contribution and professionalism.”

The point though remains that relationship between ministers and civil servants has undergone a fundamental change.

Even after the Next Steps reforms of the Thatcher era it could be said that the Civil Service retained its role as policy advisors to ministers even if large chunks of the more managerial functions were hived off to executive agencies and quangos. More recently, the role has been downgraded as ministers have become increasingly reliant upon their special advisors (SPADs). This might in part be seen as an issue of trust. SPADs are political appointments who are there to serve the minister and no one else. Questions may be asked about their expertise and ability to consider the bigger picture if they are merely concerned about the welfare of their minister, but the fact remains; the civil service have been side-lined to a certain degree.

Part of the reason for this is that Civil servants lack the expertise of their predecessors. Lord Butler (Cabinet Secretary from 1988 to 1998) stated “Civil servants move around far too much and few have enough expertise in any one department.”

To make matters worse, the austerity measures introduced by the government have focused on efficiency savings which has meant a reduction in the pay and prospects for civil servants with a consequential detrimental effect upon morale.

THE HARD FACTS

1. One in four of the senior civil servants have left and pay has been frozen and pensions reformed. Only two of the 20 permanent secretaries who were running departments in May 2010 are still in place. The department of Transport has had 3 bosses in as many years.

2. Helen Ghosh the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office was said to have had a total breakdown in her relations with Theresa May before her resignation.

3. Cameron blocked the appointment of David Kennedy, a climate change expert as Permanent Secretary at the Energy Department.

4. Outgoing Permanent Secretary at the Education Department Sir David Bell stated “The last 12 months have been more rocky in Whitehall than the preceding 12 months.”

5. Margaret Hodge chair of the Public Accounts Committee said “We don’t use their intelligence properly… Expertise is not valued enough.”

6. Lord Adonis argued “Civil servants feel they are working for an alien government that hates them.”

7. Cameron described parts of the Civil Service as “the enemies of enterprise”

FURTHER CHANGES AHEAD?

Not only can it be argued that their role of providing policy advice and expertise has changed but their impartiality and permanence could also be under threat.

Francis Maude, Cabinet Office Minister, has proposed ministers appoint Permanent Secretaries. This would bring the UK system into line with the US “spoils system” where senior appointments to the bureaucracy are made by the party of government. At the end of their term in government, not only do cabinet secretaries depart, but so too do the top swathe of all the government departments.

WHO IS TO BLAME?

Given the increased concentration of power in No 10 which has led some to argue that the UK has acquired a prime ministerial form of government, the importance of these surrounding the PM has assumed greater importance. There have been suggestions that Cameron support team is not up to the task and that he has appointed people based upon friendships rather than ability.

Policy failures could be attributed to ministerial incompetence rather than to the Civil Service. Justine Greening is a trained accountant yet she blamed the department for the problems.