On 1 May 2025, Keir Starmer’s Labour government faced its first parliamentary test at the Runcorn and Helsby byelection. This blog will examine the background to the contest, the result and what the byelection revealed about the current state of UK politics in the form of four takeaways linked to topic areas in the Pearson Edexcel and AQA A level Politics specifications. You should just bear in mind that a byelection represents a very specific snapshot (in terms of time, context and location) of the state of public opinion on politics.

Background

In the 2024 general election, Labour’s Mike Amesbury comfortably won the Cheshire constituency of Runcorn and Helsby. On a 59.7 per cent turnout, Labour obtained 22,358 votes, well ahead of second-placed Reform UK (7,662 votes) and the Conservatives (6,756 votes) who came third. At that contest, Labour secured more votes in the constituency than all the other parties put together and, with a majority of 14,696, Runcorn became the government’s 49th safest seat. The 2025 byelection was triggered by the resignation of Amesbury who stepped down as the local MP after pleading guilty in court to assault, following a violent drunken row with a constituent.

The Runcorn by election result

Following a dramatic recount, Sarah Pochin, representing Reform UK, was announced as the winner of the Runcorn and Helsby byelection, becoming the first non-Labour MP for the constituency in 52 years. Just six votes ahead of the second-placed Labour candidate, Pochin secured the narrowest margin of victory in modern UK byelection history. Both Reform UK and Labour obtained 38.7 per cent of the vote with the Conservatives, Greens and Liberal Democrats trailing behind on 7.2, 7.1 and 2.2 per cent respectively (see table below). Farage’s party appeared to benefit from local concern about immigration and was also able to capitalize on Labour’s unpopularity in the constituency regarding issues such as the cutting of the winter fuel payment, the early release of prisoners and the rising cost of energy bills. Four takeaways from the byelection are discussed below.

Four takeaways from the Runcorn byelection

• A multiparty system

The Runcorn and Helsby byelection result merely confirmed what the 2024 general election indicated – that the UK is now clearly a multiparty system. The electoral outcome in 2024 demonstrated that the traditional two-party system was fragmenting significantly with (1) a combined Conservative-Labour vote share of just 57.4 per cent (2) a record number of 117 third party candidates elected, and (3) 85 per cent of MPs returned on less than 50 per cent of the constituency vote. This shift to a multiparty system could also be discerned in three aspects of the Runcorn result. First, the two major parties together only secured 45.9 per cent of the vote, so fewer than 5 in 10 of those who cast a ballot at the byelection opted for either Labour or the Conservatives. A majority of those who voted, therefore, preferred other parties, notably Reform UK and the Greens. Second, Reform UK, currently the fifth largest party in the Commons, was able to win in one of Labour’s safest seats, pushing the Conservatives in third place. Third, six parties (those shown in the results table plus the Liberal party) and one independent candidate each obtained more than 1 per cent of the vote; four achieved more than 7 per cent.

• The participation crisis and proportional representation

In a similar vein, the Runcorn byelection also reinforced concerns raised by the 2024 general election regarding the so-called participation crisis and the fairness of the electoral system. The 2024 contest witnessed the second lowest general election turnout (59.9 per cent) in modern times, which meant that 4 in 10 members of the electorate did not vote. Furthermore, under the first past the post system, Labour were able to secure 63 per cent (412) of the seats in the Commons, having secured just 34 per cent of the vote. Although the prospect of a possible Reform UK victory had prompted extensive national and local media interest in the Runcorn byelection campaign, the actual turnout was just 46.2 per cent – so over half of eligible voters did not participate. Moreover, fewer than 4 in 10 who voted supported Reform UK, with over 6 in 10 voters backing unsuccessful candidates. Consequently, the Runcorn byelection provides further disturbing evidence of ongoing political disengagement in the UK and additional electoral data for proponents of proportional representation.

• Reform UK: from minor to major party?

Two Tutor2U blogs, which appeared in February 2025, examined the prospects for Reform UK following its breakthrough in the 2024 general election when it secured over 14 percent of the vote and 5 seats in the Commons. The Runcorn byelection result has added another interesting piece to this political jigsaw as all the main parties begin the long process of gearing up for the next general election, expected in 2029. Certainly, Reform UK has passed its first important political test after last year’s general election by converting its poll ratings into another parliamentary seat. By garnering much more support than the Conservatives at the Runcorn contest, Reform UK have added some limited credibility to their claim that they are now the real opposition to the government. In addition, the fact that Reform UK was able to take on Starmer’s party in one of the latter’s safer seats and overturn a 14,696 majority has had a psychologically demoralizing impact on many Labour MPs, who now fear that they could lose a significant number of seats to the right-wing populist party at the next general election.

• Labour and Conservative reaction

Starmer’s more hardline statements (‘island of strangers’) and proposals concerning immigration after the byelection are clearly a calculated attempt to head off the electoral threat posed by Reform UK. However, many political commentators are not convinced that Labour’s ‘Reform-lite’ strategy will work because in their view (1) it will alienate progressive centre-left Labour voters, and (2) it will not attract those drawn to Farage’s more uncompromising stance on immigration. Although the Conservatives were not expected to come close to winning the Runcorn byelection, the Tory performance (7.2 per cent of the vote, down from 16 per cent in 2024), only just ahead of the Greens and way behind Reform UK, enabled Farage to claim that ‘after tonight, there’s no question, in most of the country we are now the main opposition party to this government.’ In some quarters too, the byelection result reinforced the perception that Reform UK poses a real existential threat to the Conservatives. Kemi Badenoch’s hoped-for swing of the political pendulum back towards the Tories (as has happened in the past) cannot be guaranteed given the present fragmented state of UK politics, in no small part due to the Reform UK surge. Similarly, Robert Jenrick’s call for a right-wing coalition between the Conservatives and Reform UK may be so much wishful thinking if Farage’s party continues to advance at the Tories’ expense.