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Edexcel Economics 2.6.2: Evaluating Quantitative Easing

Geoff Riley

20th November 2026

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When the Bank of England launched Quantitative Easing (QE) in March 2009, it was billed as emergency medicine for an economy on life support. With Bank Rate slashed to 0.5%, the Monetary Policy Committee turned to its Asset Purchase Facility (APF), creating electronic reserves to buy government bonds (gilts), depress long-term yields, and revive aggregate demand. Seventeen years later, has QE worked to the benefit of the UK economy?

Edexcel Economics 2.6.2: Evaluating Quantitative Easing

In moments of acute panic, QE proved its worth. During the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis and again in the March 2020 pandemic shock, bond markets froze and deflationary spirals loomed. By stepping in as a buyer of last resort—eventually accumulating £895 billion of assets—the Bank restored market liquidity, compressed gilt yields, and propped up confidence. Empirical estimates suggest that the first wave of QE lifted UK real GDP by 1.5% to 2% and prevented far deeper scarring in the labour market.

Yet as QE stretched from an emergency measure into a decade-long habit, diminishing returns set in. In calmer markets,subsequent rounds in 2012 and 2016 delivered far less bang for the buck. Crucially, the transmission mechanism was lopsided: QE reliably inflated asset prices—boosting equities and property, and widening UK wealth inequality—but struggled to stimulate direct commercial bank lending or long-term business investment. When pandemic-era liquidity collided with global supply shocks in 2021–22, it also added fuel to the inflationary fire.

Ultimately, judging QE requires confronting the counterfactual. Without it in 2009 and 2020, deeper recessions and soaring unemployment would have inflicted far greater economic and fiscal damage. QE was never a silver bullet for weak productivity, but as an emergency stabiliser, it did its job—even if Britain is still paying the price for leaving the tap on too long.

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Geoff Riley

Geoff Riley FRSA has been teaching Economics for nearly forty years. He has over twenty years experience as Head of Economics at leading schools. He writes extensively and is a contributor and presenter on CPD and Revision conferences in the UK and overseas.