Owners v Managers and the Principle Agent Problem
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Simon Evans writing in the Independent asks if we are seeing an age of greater shareholder activism against the entrenched power of executives at the helm of listed companies? A useful article for A2 students keen to have some examples of shareholders putting more pressure on managers but the limitations of scrutiny that lies at the heart of the principle-agent-problem.
”Owners vs managers
Bellway: Almost 60 per cent of shareholders at Bellway’s AGM in January voted against a bonus deal for John Watson, the chief executive, which would have seen him awarded a bonus worth more than half his salary.
Target Corporation: New York-listed Target is under pressure from Pershing Square Capital Management after a decline in profit. Target is cutting costs by freezing the salaries of senior managers and taking on rival Wal-Mart by expanding its food sales. Pershing, with an 8 per cent stake, wants more substantial moves, such as replacing the board of directors.”
The rest of the article is here
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